The British Journal of Aesthetics - current issue

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Thu, 07 Jan 2010 05:51:01 PST

Why Sibley is Not a Generalist After All

Bergqvist, A. — Thu, 07 Jan 2010 05:51:01 PST

In his influential paper, ‘General Criteria and Reasons in Aesthetics’, Frank Sibley outlines what is taken to be a generalist view (shared with Beardsley) such that there are general reasons for aesthetic judgement, and his account of the behaviour of such reasons, which differs from Beardsley's. In this paper my aim is to illuminate Sibley's position by employing a distinction that has arisen in meta-ethics in response to recent work by Jonathan Dancy in particular. Contemporary research involves two related yet distinct debates: (i) that between the particularist and the generalist on the status of moral principles; and (ii) that between holists and atomists on the nature of reasons. This division of labour has no correlate within the aesthetic particularism–generalism debate, and I will show how the ideas developed in relation to meta-ethics illuminate a difficulty with Sibley's view. I argue that we should understand Sibley as subscribing to both particularism and a version of holism about aesthetic reasons.

Pictures, Pictorial Contents and Vision

Gregory, D. — Thu, 07 Jan 2010 05:51:01 PST

Certain simple thoughts about pictures suggest that the contents of pictures are closely bound to vision. But how far can the striking features of depiction be accounted for merely in terms of the especially visual contents which belong to pictures, without considering, for example, any issues concerning the nature of the visual experiences with which pictures provide us? This article addresses that question by providing an account of the distinctively visual contents belonging to pictures, and by using that account to explain many notable general facts about depiction. Some implications of the resulting framework for the main stream of current theorizing about pictorial representation are also discussed.

Confessions of an Unrepentant Timbral Sonicist

Dodd, J. — Thu, 07 Jan 2010 05:51:01 PST

Simplifying somewhat, sonicists believe that works of music are individuated purely in terms of how they sound. For them, exact sound-alikes are identical. Stephen Davies, in his ‘Musical Works and Orchestral Colour’ (BJA 48 (2008), pp. 363–375) took me to task for defending a version of sonicism. In this paper I seek to explain why Davies's objections miss their mark. In the course of the discussion, I make some methodological remarks about the ontology of music.

A New Look at Kant's View of Aesthetic Testimony

Gorodeisky, K. — Thu, 07 Jan 2010 05:51:01 PST

In this paper I explore the following threefold question: first, is there a genuine problem of grounding aesthetic judgement in testimony? Second, if there is such a problem, what exactly is its nature? And lastly, can Kant help us get clearer on the problem? Following Kant, I argue that the problem with aesthetic testimony is explained by norms that govern what it takes to judge a beautiful object aesthetically, rather than theoretically or practically, not by norms that govern what it takes to judge aesthetically with a sufficient epistemic basis rather than without it. I thus propose a normative and aesthetic approach to testimony.

The Perception of Music: Comments on Peacocke

Boghossian, P. — Thu, 07 Jan 2010 05:51:01 PST

Precis of The Philosophy of Literature

Lamarque, P. — Thu, 07 Jan 2010 05:51:01 PST

The Singular Events of Literature

Attridge, D. — Thu, 07 Jan 2010 05:51:01 PST

The Philosophy of Literature offers an opportunity to consider the gap between the analytic and the continental traditions of aesthetics. In particular, Lamarque's survey fails to take account of the possibility that literature is an institution and a practice that challenges the conventions of instrumental rationality, a position held by a number of continental philosophers who have written on art. It also pays little attention to the reader's experience of the inventiveness of the literary work, preferring to represent the reading of literature as a matter of conventions confirmed. An alternative understanding of the literary work as an event that opens up new possibilities for the reader, put forward in the author's recent book, The Singularity of Literature, is sketched.

Some Remarks about Value as a Work of Literature

Blackburn, S. — Thu, 07 Jan 2010 05:51:01 PST

Peter Lamarque's splendid and informative book, The Philosphy of Literature, deserves a much fuller response than I can give in this brief note. It is brimful with insights into the nature of literature, and into the debates between philosophers interested in literature, and I cannot imagine anyone failing to learn from it. The question I propose to take up is by no means the most important that Lamarque raises, nor am I even certain that I can add anything useful to his own discussion of it. Yet I find myself puzzled by it, and hope that it may repay further thought.

Giving Emotions Their Due

Feagin, S. — Thu, 07 Jan 2010 05:51:01 PST

It is a widespread view that affective and emotional responses to many works of literature are often components of an appreciation of literature that is richer than it would be without them. In this paper, I raise three points designed to show that Lamarque does not give emotional and other affective responses their due. First, I propose that he does not sufficiently distinguish emotion and imagination from concerns about knowledge and truth. Second, he does not sufficiently distinguish appreciation, and the role of emotions within it, from criticism. And third, there is a conflation of accounts of the value of individual works with accounts of the value of having literature as an institution around.

Truth and the 'Work' of Literary Fiction

Harcourt, E. — Thu, 07 Jan 2010 05:51:01 PST

As Lamarque agrees, to read philosophy is to read for truth, so if literary fiction non-accidentally conveys philosophical claims, Lamarque's anti-cognitivist position on it must be flawed. Deploying Iris Murdoch's notion of the ‘work’ an author does in a text, I try to expand what should be understood by an argument in this context, and thus address Lamarque's argument that literary fiction cannot non-accidentally convey philosophical claims because it typically contains no arguments. The main literary example is George Eliot's Felix Holt; special reference is made to the idea of an author's complicity with the reader.

Replies to Attridge, Blackburn, Feagin, and Harcourt

Lamarque, P. — Thu, 07 Jan 2010 05:51:01 PST

Self-Expression

Hagberg, G. L. — Thu, 07 Jan 2010 05:51:01 PST

The Art Instinct

Skidelsky, E. — Thu, 07 Jan 2010 05:51:01 PST

The Routledge Companion to Film and Philosophy

Carel, H. — Thu, 07 Jan 2010 05:51:01 PST

Aesthetics and Nature

Brady, E. — Thu, 07 Jan 2010 05:51:01 PST

BOOKS RECEIVED

Thu, 07 Jan 2010 05:51:01 PST

JOURNALS RECEIVED

Thu, 07 Jan 2010 05:51:01 PST