The British Journal of Aesthetics - Advance Access

Fantasy, Imagination, and Film

Stock, K. — 2009-07-02

In his article ‘Fantasy, Imagination and the Screen’, Roger Scruton offers an account of fantasy, arguing that it is directed away from reality in some important sense, and that cinema is its natural representational medium. I address certain problems with Scruton's basic account, thereby producing a significantly amended version, though one that owes a great debt to his. I explain why, as he says, much fantasy is significantly directed away from reality; and conclude with some brief remarks about why it might be that cinema is indeed a good medium for the fantasist's ends.

Ronald W. Hepburn: In Memoriam

Brady, E. — 2009-06-16

How to Defend Response Moralism

Hazlett, A. — 2009-06-16

Five Fictions in Search of Truth

Morris, M. — 2009-06-10

Aesthetics and Music

Rowe, M. W. — 2009-06-10

Comics as Literature?

Meskin, A. — 2009-06-10

Not all comics are art. What about the comics that are art? What sort of art are they? In particular, are comics a form of literature? For a variety of reasons it is tempting to think that at least some comics are literature. Nevertheless, many theorists reject the ‘comics as literature’ view. And although some reasons for resisting that view are misguided, I shall argue that there are other good reasons for being hesitant about treating comics as a form of literature. This leaves us at an impasse with respect to the classification of comics. I suggest that the way out of the impasse is to recognize that comics are a hybrid art form.

Critical Musicology and the Responsibility of Response: Selected Essays

Gritten, A. — 2009-06-08

Constitution and Qua Objects in the Ontology of Music

Evnine, S. J. — 2009-04-21

Musical Platonists identify musical works with abstract sound structures but this implies that they are not created but only discovered. Jerrold Levinson adapts Platonism to allow for creation by identifying musical works with indicated sound structures. In this paper I explore the similarities between Levinson's view and Kit Fine's theory of qua objects. Fine offers the theory of qua objects as an account of constitution, as it obtains, for example, between a statue and the clay the statue is made out of. I argue that Fine's theory does not adequately characterize the constitution relation and that the problems it faces extend to Levinson's account of musical works as indicated structures. I develop an alternative theory of constitution, based on the notion of being made out of. This approach to constitution enables me to offer an account of musical works as abstract objects that are constituted by sound structures. I argue that my account has several advantages over the Levinson/Fine approach.