Skip Navigation

The British Journal of Aesthetics 2008 48(1):45-64; doi:10.1093/aesthj/aym038
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Harold, J.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© British Society of Aesthetics 2008

Immoralism and the Valence Constraint

James Harold

James Harold, Philosophy Department, Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, MA 01075, USA. Email: jharold{at}mtholyoke.edu


  Abstract

Immoralists hold that in at least some cases, moral flaws in artworks can increase their aesthetic value. They deny what I call the valence constraint: the view that any effect that an artwork's moral value has on its aesthetic merit must have the same valence. The immoralist offers three arguments against the valence constraint. In this paper I argue that these arguments fail, and that this failure reveals something deep and interesting about the relationship between cognitive and moral value. In the final section I offer a positive argument for the valence constraint.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer:
Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.