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The British Journal of Aesthetics 2003 43(1):75-79; doi:10.1093/bjaesthetics/43.1.75
© 2003 by British Society of Aesthetics
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Cohen on Kant's Aesthetic Judgements

Dabney Townsend1

1 Armstrong Atlantic State University, Savannah, PO Box 915, Pooler, GA 31322, USA. Email: townseda{at}mail.armstrong.edu

This commentary argues that Ted Cohen's claim that Kant confuses logical and aesthetic judgements (in ‘Three Problems in Kant's Aesthetics’, British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 42 [2002], pp. 1–12) can be countered by a somewhat different reading of Kant's argument in §8 of the Critique of Judgement. Cohen construes Kant's argument as an inductive generalization based on common properties. I suggest, instead, that Kant distinguishes between judgements of taste, which do not require concepts, and logical generalizations that are based directly on experience and that do allow concepts. ‘Beauty’ is used equivocally, but that frees Kant from the charge of logical error or self-contradiction.


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