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The British Journal of Aesthetics 2003 43(1):57-64; doi:10.1093/bjaesthetics/43.1.57
© 2003 by British Society of Aesthetics
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James Shelley on Critical Principles

George Dickie1

1 5901 North Sheridan Road, Apartment 9A, Chicago, IL 60660, USA. GeoTDickie26{at}aol.com

James Shelley claims that Hume's principles of taste have value-neutral subjects rather than value-laden ones that, for example, refer to aesthetic properties. I try to rebut his claim. I argue that Hume's essay on taste contains the conceptual means for recognizing the problem of the interaction of aesthetic properties with other properties in artworks, even if he does not explicitly make this point. I also deny Shelley's contention that I claim that principles are used as part of a temporal process to infer evaluational conclusions. Against Shelly's attack, I defend my use of the isolation clause in formulating evaluational principles. Finally, I show a way to formulate evaluational principles without the isolation clause by substituting an interaction clause.


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