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The British Journal of Aesthetics 2002 42(4):419-422; doi:10.1093/bjaesthetics/42.4.419
© 2002 by British Society of Aesthetics
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Intentional Forgeries and Accidental Versions: A Response to John Dilworth

Peter Kivy1

1 Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, USA

In my article, ‘How to Forge a Musical Work’, I argue that the best way to view an attempted forgery of a lost autograph that accidentally duplicates the lost original is as a ‘version’, not a ‘forgery’, although I acknowledge the plausibility of Jerrold Levinson's alternate view, that it remains a forgery nevertheless. John Dilworth, in his article, ‘A Representational Theory of Artefacts and Artworks’, defends Levinson's ‘intuition’ against mine. In the present article I argue that our ‘intuitions’ here are divided, as they are in the case of fictional literary works that accidentally turn out to be ‘true’, where some would say that what we have is still ‘fiction’, others that it is ‘accidental history’.


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